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ABSTRACT.  
 
We examine the manner in which the population prevalence of disordered gambling has usually been 
estimated, on the basis of surveys that suffer from a potential sample selection bias. General 
population surveys screen respondents using seemingly innocuous “trigger,” “gateway” or 
“diagnostic stem” questions, applied before they ask the actual questions about gambling behavior 
and attitudes. Modeling the latent sample selection behavior generated by these trigger questions 
using up-to-date econometrics for sample selection bias correction leads to dramatically different 
inferences about population prevalence and comorbidities with other psychiatric disorders. The 
population prevalence of problem or pathological gambling in the United States is inferred to be 
7.7% rather than 1.3% when this behavioral response is ignored. Comorbidities are inferred to be 
much smaller than the received wisdom, particularly when considering the marginal association with 
other mental health problems rather than the total association. The issues identified here apply, in 
principle, to every psychiatric disorder covered by standard mental health surveys, and not just 
gambling disorder. We discuss ways in which these behavioral biases can be mitigated in future 
surveys. 
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Prevalence studies of disordered gambling have been conducted in many countries over 
three decades (Williams, Volberg, and Stevens [2012]). In consequence there is widespread 
consensus that gambling disorder, at least of a level of severity warranting clinical intervention, is a 
relatively rare mental disorder, though one that has become more common in many jurisdictions as a 
result of more widespread gambling opportunities. Based on the application of econometric 
methods for identification and control of sample selection bias, we question this consensus, 
concluding that prevalence of gambling problems in the general population is likely to be 
significantly larger than generally thought. The issues identified here apply, in principle, to every 
disorder for which prevalence is estimated using surveys based on psychiatric screening instruments, 
and not just gambling disorder.  
Scholarly research consistently finds high shares of commercial gambling revenue to be 
derived from proportions of populations that are much smaller that the large proportion who 
occasionally or frequently gamble. For the United States 15% of revenue derives from 0.5% of the 
population, for Canada 23% derives from 4.2% of the population, for Australia 33% derives from 
2.1% of the population, and for New Zealand 19% derives from just 1.3% of the population.1 It is 
primarily among the ranks of these high-spending gamblers that one finds those who currently have, 
or are at greatest risk for having, clinically diagnosable gambling problems. And the largest share of 
casino gambling floor revenue now derives from electronic slot and poker machines, which are 
strikingly characterized as constituting an Addiction by Design by Schüll [2012]. 
We examine in detail the manner in which the population prevalence of disordered gambling 
 
1 See Goldstein et al. [1999], Williams and Wood [2004], Australian Productivity Commission [1999] 
and Abbott and Volberg [2000], respectively. Definitions of those most at risk of gambling-control problems 
vary across studies, for reasons we discuss in detail, but all are conventional in the extant literature. 
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has been estimated by psychologists and psychiatric researchers. Surveys of disordered gambling 
have traditionally used screens designed to detect individuals who engage in gambling activity that 
might lead them to clinically “present” and meet criteria for diagnosis of a psychiatric disorder. This 
is a valid scientific goal for the design, calibration and application of such surveys, although it is not 
the only possible goal or the most interesting for broader public health assessments.2 We reconsider 
the manner in which inferences about gambling problems in the general population are made based 
on these surveys. We suggest that there are different kinds of inferences possible than have 
traditionally been emphasized, and that there is a recurring, major sample selection bias that has not 
been accounted for. When that bias is corrected we infer significantly greater prevalence of gambling 
disorders, and notably fewer comorbidities with other mental health problems than are typically 
reported. Thus we contribute to isolating gambling disorder as a partly discrete public health 
problem to which policies can be specifically targeted and their efficiency evaluated. 
Most of the inferences that have been drawn based on analysis of prevalence surveys have 
concerned general population prevalence, socio-demographic correlates, and comorbidities. They 
have typically focused on the binary classification of individuals as “disordered,” “pathological” or 
“problem” gamblers, or not, where these terms are defined either directly or approximately in terms 
of DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association [1994]) clinical criteria. Since the classification of the 
condition under “Substance-Related and Addictive Disorders” in DSM 5 (American Psychiatric 
Association [2013]), it has become standard usage to refer to it as “Gambling Disorder”.  
Henceforth, where we refer to the clinical phenomenon ex cathedra we will follow DSM 5 and 
use “gambling disorder” (GD). We will refer to a representative person who has acquired the 
 
2 Kessler and Pennell [2015; p. 144ff.] provide a valuable review of the historical evolution of survey 
research on mental disorders. 
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condition as a “disordered gambler” (DG). Where we refer to previous work set in clinical contexts 
that used either “pathological” or “problem” gambling without distinguishing them, or intending 
that they be distinguished (for example, in some work applying the Problem Gambling Severity 
Index (PGSI) (Ferris and Wynn [2001[), we will anachronistically use the terms “gambling disorder” 
and “disordered gambler.” Where we are referring to a context in which “problem gambling” and 
“pathological gambling” are distinguished, with the former denoting a pre-clinical or warning state 
for the latter, we retain the distinction and use these older terms. Finally, when we talk about 
harmful consequences of gambling outside the clinical context we use “gambling problems” as a 
non-technical term of everyday English. 
An original goal of DSM 5 was to shift focus away from categorical classifications 
emphasized in DSM–III and DSM–IV (e.g., “pathological/non-pathological”) to continuous 
measures, understood as probing continua between normal and disordered functioning. However, 
the American Psychiatric Association ultimately decided to defer this ambition, and GD continues to 
be clinically regarded as a pathology from which a person either suffers or does not. We implicitly 
consider that classification, but expand the analysis to include the range of gambling problems as an 
ordered hierarchy. Our interest is in the latent continuum of gambling problems, as a complement to 
studying binary classifications with thresholds.3 This interest corresponds to our ultimate focus, as 
economists concerned with the general impact on welfare of gambling and public health policy, on 
evaluating the severity of all problems associated with gambling, which include but are not limited to 
the form of addiction that DSM 5 labels as GD.4 
 
3 Examples of the many studies of the continuum of gambling disorders include Toce-Gerstein, 
Gerstein and Volberg [2003] and Blanco, Hasin, Petry, Stinson and Grant [2006]. 
4 Harrison and Ng [2016] is an example of our general approach, applied to the problems of making 
decisions over an insurance product to evaluate the welfare cost to the individual of observed choices. That 
cost is measured by the foregone income-equivalent of the observed choice compared to what a latent 
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In Section 1 we reconsider inferences from the National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and 
Related Conditions (NESARC) in the United States. The first wave of NESARC was conducted in 
2000 and 2001, and had a sample of 43,093 individuals.5 The instrument for measuring gambling 
problems was based on the DSM-IV criteria, and DSM-IV criteria were likewise used for the 
instruments measuring other major psychiatric disorders.6 
The most significant statistical issues arise from the difficulty of drawing inferences about 
GD prevalence and comorbidity when one attempts to account for the sample selection bias of 
“trigger,” “gateway” or “diagnostic stem” questions. Such questions ask whether a respondent has 
ever gambled more frequently than some threshold rate or number of occasions, and/or whether 
they have ever gambled away more than some threshold amount of money on any single occasion. 
Only respondents who report meeting the relevant thresholds are asked the remaining gambling 
screen questions. A main motivation for use of trigger questions is not to irritate respondents by 
asking them about gambling problems after they have effectively said that they are not regular 
gamblers, or perhaps not gamblers at all. This motivation is particularly easy to appreciate in the case 
of surveys such as the NESARC, which address multiple potential disorders; the surveyor does not 
want to risk reduced cooperation on other survey modules by annoying respondents about gambling 
 
structural theory predicts that the individual should have made. Calculating this income cost, which in the 
case of insurance arguably maps relatively straightforwardly onto welfare costs, requires a different set of data 
about the individual than one finds in surveys, but the end result is more usefully compared to non-binary 
measures of the severity of behavior.   
5 The second wave of the NESARC was conducted in 2004/5, and was a longitudinal panel of 34,653 
re-interviews from the first wave. The third wave was conducted in 2012/13, with a fresh sample of 36,309 
individuals. Gambling prevalence questions were removed from waves 2 and 3 of the NESARC. Our analysis 
was prepared using a limited access data set obtained from the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and 
Alcoholism (NIAA) and does not reflect the opinions or views of NIAAA or the U.S. Government. 
6 A comparable national survey that could also be evaluated in the same manner is the National 
Comorbidity Survey Replication conducted in the United States between 2001 and 2003 with a primary sample of 
9,282 individuals. We discuss the Canadian Community Health Survey of Mental Health and Well-Being of 2002 and 
the British Gambling Prevalence Survey of 2010 below. 
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problems they (apparently) manifestly do not have. 
The potential for sample selection bias arises when there is some systematic factor explaining 
why someone might not want to participate in the full set of questions, and therefore deliberately or 
subconsciously selects out of that full set by answering a certain way in response to the trigger 
question.7 Sometimes this potential leads to no difference in inferences from the observed sample: 
for instance, if respondents want to spend more time in a face-to-face interview with more attractive 
interviewers, and the attractiveness level of interviewers is random, there will be no a priori reason to 
expect an effect on inferences about gambling risks. On the other hand, if someone wants to hide 
their gambling problems, they might reasonably choose to lie in response to the trigger question. 
Indeed, hiding gambling problems is explicit in one of the criteria used in the full set of questions for 
determining the extent to which someone is at risk for GD or should be classified as a DG! There 
are no perfect statistical methods to correct for this bias, but the bias appears to be significant in the 
case of several major, influential surveys of gambling problems that used trigger questions. We 
therefore take some time in section 2 to review the rationale for these trigger questions, and note  
the vigorous  rhetoric sometimes used to defend them. We suspect that the strength of these 
 
7 Hernán, Hernández-Diaz and Robins [2004] survey the many types of selection bias considered in 
epidemiology, and provide a general causal framework. The selection bias of concern here is a mixture of 
what they call “nonresponse bias/missing data bias,” “volunteer bias/self-selection bias,” and “health worker 
bias” (p. 618). Various statistical correction methods are discussed in major epidemiology texts, such as 
Rothman, Greenland and Lash [2012; ch. 19]. To our knowledge, there are no applications of epidemiological 
corrections for these biases to general population surveys with trigger questions, although there are recognitions 
of their potential importance (Tam, Midanik, Greenfield and Caetano [1996] and Tam and Midanik [2000]). 
Caetano [2001; p.1543] editorialized on this issue in a clear fashion: “So, are survey respondents different 
from non-respondents in their use of alcohol and illicit drugs? The answer from the small number of studies 
mentioned above seems to be positive. But are my critics right in assuming that non-respondents are more 
likely than respondents to be drinkers, heavier drinkers or dependent on alcohol and illicit drugs? The 
evidence then suggests that, to use a common American expression, the ‘jury is still out.’ This is so partly 
because for the past 40 years those of us facing the critics have been complacent about the validity of survey 
research. The uncertainty regarding selective non-response should not justify the apparent lack of attention to 
the issue.” 
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defenses is thought to be justified by an expectation that they have no effect on inference, and the 
efficiency gains in the time needed to conduct surveys that are apparent from their use. 
Section 3 draws some conclusions, including recommendations for future survey design and 
analysis.  
 
1. Estimates for the United States from NESARC 
A. Comorbidities 
The prevailing view is that GD typically co-occurs with a variety of other mental disorders. 
Petry et al. [2005; p.564] evaluated this using NESARC data and concluded that GD is “highly 
comorbid with substance use, mood, anxiety, and personality disorders, suggesting that treatment for 
one condition should involve assessment and possible concomitant treatment for comorbid 
conditions.” Panel A of Table 1 replicates their methods and essentially obtains the same results, 
using a logistic specification.8 All calculations with the NESARC correct for the complex sampling 
design.9 In each row the independent binary variable is whether the respondent is defined as having 
 
8 Their analysis, and most of those using the NESARC to study DG, suffers from an unfortunate 
coding error explained in Appendix A. There are in fact 207 respondents that meet the DSM-IV criteria, not 
the 195 used in most studies. The incorrectly coded classification had 21 respondents that should have been 
classified as DGs, and 9 that should not have been so classified. The effect is to change estimates slightly. We 
only use the correct DSM-IV classification of pathological gambling from the NESARC. None of our 
qualitative conclusions are affected by using the incorrect classification. 
9 The NESARC used a three-stage sampling design, with a sampling frame of adults aged 18 and over 
in non-institutionalized settings. Stage 1 was primary sampling unit (PSU) selection using the PSUs from the 
Census 2000/2001 Supplementary Survey, a national survey of 78,300 households per month. Stage 2 was 
household selection from the sampled PSUs. Finally, in stage 3, one sample person was selected at random 
from each household. In stage 1 there were 401 PSUs that were so large that they were designated “self 
representing,” meaning that they were selected with certainty; another 254 PSUs were selected in proportion 
to 1996 population estimates for each of 9 strata within a state (so there are 10 strata, including the state). 
Self-representing PSUs within a state are correctly treated as being selected with certainty, and hence 
contributing nothing to the estimated standard error as a PSU. 
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the indicated psychiatric disorder or not.10 Petry et al. [2005] examine the risk of being what we 
would now call a DG, and this is the sole risk level used in Table 1. Each of the odds ratio (OR) 
estimates in Panel A are much greater than 1, and statistically significantly greater than 1: the lower 
bound of the 95% confidence interval is well above 1. 
These analyses of comorbidities examine “total effects” rather than “marginal effects.” We 
say that one has measured the total effect of some secondary psychiatric disorder X on the focus 
disorder Y when there are no controls for the presence of other psychiatric disorders A, B, C … etc. 
The marginal effect of psychiatric disorder X is measured when one controls for the presence of 
other psychiatric disorders. Both types of effects can be of interest for public health and clinical 
purposes, and answer different questions.11 The total effect answers a question along these lines: “If 
all I know about a group of people is that they abuse alcohol, how likely is it that they are also 
DGs?” Another total effect question might be, “If all I know about a group of people is that they are 
chronically depressed, how likely is it that they are also DGs?” Assume, as is the case, that both total 
effects are positive and statistically significant. The marginal effect answers a different question, of 
the following kind: “If I know that people abuse alcohol and/or are chronically depressed, what is 
the incremental correlation of each disorder with their also suffering from GD?” It could be that the 
incremental correlation of alcohol abuse is low or non-existent and the incremental correlation of 
chronic depression is high. These particular correlations suggest, but of course do not prove, that 
there is causality from chronic depression to GD, none from alcohol abuse to GD, and some from 
 
10 A constant term is always employed as well. This is what Petry et al. [2005] refer to as “model 1,” 
where there are no additional covariates added. 
11 Epidemiologists often report “adjusted odds ratios,” which control for covariates. Typically the list 
of covariates is very small. 
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chronic depression to alcohol abuse (or vice versa).12 If this suggestion is correct, it has direct 
implications for treatment for GD. We would argue that marginal effects are closer to what we want 
to learn about from evaluation of general population surveys, at least for purposes of designing and 
choosing public health interventions, than total effects. 
Panel B of Table 1 shows the estimates of comorbidities, focusing on marginal effects and 
the implied OR. We use the same econometric specification as Panel A, for comparability. The point 
estimates are much closer to 1 than the total effects, as are the lower bounds of the 95% confidence 
intervals. In one case, the comorbidity of anxiety and GD, the OR is not statistically significantly 
different from 1. The upper bound of the 95% confidence interval of marginal effects in Panel B are 
all well below the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval of total effects in Panel A. 
Panels C and D of Table 1 show comparable estimates of total and marginal effects if one 
includes a long list of socio-economic and socio-demographic covariates.13 There is a slight lowering 
of most of the OR compared to Panels A and B, respectively, but no significant change from the 
conclusions drawn from Panels A and B. 
 
B. Sample Selection 
Panel E of Table 1 lists additional covariates from the logistic model estimated to obtain the 
marginal effects in Panels C and D. To informally motivate the concern with sample selection bias, 
 
12 We know well the dangers of inferring causality from correlations, and indeed this concern is why 
many modern surveys of mental health take time to ask additional questions about “age of onset.” This 
information is particularly important when asking about incidence over lifetime frames, since the correlation 
might have any one of three temporal sequences (prior, simultaneous, and posterior). This is also why one-
shot general population surveys are not the same as clinical evaluations that occur over several meetings, 
despite the attempt to ask questions about the clinical significance of symptoms. Moreover, it becomes 
difficult in general surveys to ask enough about the history of an individual to establish if a disorder is 
“substance-induced,” which is one exclusion criteria used for mood disorders, for example. 
13 This is “model 3” of Petry et al. [2005]. 
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focus on the OR ratios in Panel E in bold. Imagine we encounter men, Blacks, those separated by 
divorce or death, people living in the West, those without a college or graduate degree, and those 
with a personal income over $70k at the time of the survey. The value of these OR estimates, and 
their statistical significance, tell us that respondents with these characteristics are more likely to be 
DGs. So suppose we encounter respondents with these characteristics who happened not to respond 
affirmatively to the trigger question? Without knowing their responses to the trigger question we 
would be inclined to suspect them of some greater-than-baseline risk of GD, ceteris paribus. The only 
reason they are not so classified is that their response to the trigger question led to them being 
assumed to have no current or past gambling problems and, therefore, no risk of GD. This involves 
two fallacious inferences: first, that no one who says “no” to the trigger question has any current or 
past gambling problems, and, second, that there are no other potential indicators of risk. We can 
easily imagine some degree of sample selection bias if the responses to the trigger question are 
correlated with the characteristics that constitute these additional indicators.14 This is loose and 
informal, since it is based on a “chicken and egg” fallacy – we are looking at estimates that ignore 
this sample selection correction to motivate the possibility of sample selection bias. But as long as 
we check this with appropriate methods, this motivation is acceptable. 
The sample selection models developed by Heckman [1976][1979] meet this need. They 
require the researcher to specify a sample selection process, characterizing which respondents appear 
 
14 This example also points to the logic of the correction for sample selection discussed below. If 
there is a correlation between the unobserved characteristics that affect one’s selection into the sample and 
the unobserved characteristics that affect one’s chance of being at risk for gambling problems, then the 
residuals from equations measuring these two behavioral responses (to the trigger question, and then to the full 
set of questions) will also be correlated. This correlation of the residuals, or covariance, is used to infer what 
the responses would have been to the full set of equations if there had not been this systematic selection into 
the sample responding to the full set of questions. Note that we stress the idea of a “systematic” selection 
bias, with no presumption that it is a deliberate choice to lie in response to the trigger question. 
 10 
 
in the main survey and which do not. Typically this is a simple binary matter, so one can specify this 
process with a probit model. In our case the sample selection consists of some trigger questions we 
examine in a moment; if the respondent passes these, they are admitted to the main survey and asked 
the DSM criteria questions. The Heckman approach also requires a model of the data generation 
process in the main survey. In our case this might consist of a binary choice statistical model 
explaining whether someone meets the DSM threshold for being potentially classified as a DG. 
In the original setting studied by Heckman [1976][1979] the main data generating process of 
interest, and potentially subject to sample selection bias, had a dependent variable that was 
continuous, and the specification was Ordinary Least Squares. In our case, at least initially, the main 
data generating process underlying the classification as a DG is binary, and the same ideas carry over: 
Van de Ven and Van Praag [1981] is the first application of sample selection to a probit specification 
of the behavior of interest, and Lee [1983] and Maddala [1983] provide general expositions. 
One important assumption in the standard sample selection model is to specify some 
structure for the errors of the two equations, the sample selection equation and the main survey 
question. If both equations are modeled with probit specifications, for example, the natural first 
assumption is that the errors are bivariate normal.15 We assume instead a flexible semi-nonparametric 
(SNP) approach due to Gallant and Nychka [1987], applied to the sample selection model by De 
Luca and Perotti [2011]. This SNP approach approximates the bivariate density function of the 
errors by a Hermite polynomial expansion.16 
 
15 The methods we use are full maximum likelihood. The “limited information” estimator of 
Heckman [1976][1979] did not require all of the properties of the bivariate normal distribution. All that was 
required was that there be a linear relationship between the errors of the two equations, and that the error of 
the sample selection equation be marginally normal (so that one could calculate the inverse Mills ratio).    
16 This SNP approach is computationally less intensive than comparable approaches based on the 
estimation of kernel densities. There is some evidence from Stewart [2005] and De Luca [2008] that this SNP 
approach has good finite sample performance when compared to conventional parametric alternatives and 
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In addition, another important assumption in the sample selection model, said to be “good 
for identification,” is to find variables that explain sample selection but that a priori do not explain 
the main outcome. In many expositions one sees the comment that in the absence of these 
“exclusion restrictions” the sample selection model is “problematic.” Often this is a major empirical 
challenge, since it can be hard to exclude something from potentially affecting the main variable of 
interest, but to include it as likely to affect sample selection. In epidemiology, for instance, a spirited 
defence17 of the use of sample selection corrections to estimates of HIV prevalence in Bärnighausen 
et al. [2011a] came from Bärnighausen et al. [2011b] on the grounds that they had access to ideal 
exclusionary restrictions: the identity of the survey interviewer. We agree that this exclusion 
restriction is an attractive and reasonably general one, but it is not universally applicable. 
What is particularly “problematic” in the absence of a priori convincing exclusion restrictions is 
that one must rely on having the right econometric specification if the sample selection model is to 
correct for sample selection bias. This specification in turn refers to the specification of the two 
equations as probit models, and specifically to the assumed bivariate normality of errors.18 The 
 
other SNP estimators. Stewart [2004; §3] provides an excellent discussion of the mild regularity conditions 
required for the SNP approximation to be valid, and the manner in which it is implemented so as to ensure 
that a special case is the parametric (ordered) probit specification. Appendix C presents the formal statistical 
model. 
17 Criticisms were raised by Geneletti, Mason and Best [2011] in response to epidemiological 
applications of corrections for sample selection by Chaix et al. [2011] and Bärnighausen et al. [2011a].  
18 Thus one finds comments such as: “Theoretically, we do not need such identifying variables, but 
without them, we depend on functional form to identify the model. It would be difficult for anyone to take 
such results seriously because the functional form assumptions have no firm basis in theory.” (StataCorp 
[2013; p. 782]). A similar comment from Bärnighausen et al. [2011b; p. 446] in an epidemiological setting is 
that the “... performance of a Heckman-type model depends critically on the use of valid exclusion 
restrictions....” It is agreed that the functional form assumptions, including the bivariate normal error 
assumptions, have no firm basis in theory, but we make such assumptions all the time in other settings. If we 
can indeed test them, that would be ideal, but it is not clear why we should in this instance not use them if we 
have to. Our view is that these models should be viewed as statistical “canaries in the cave,” in the sense of 
pointing to potentially disastrous conditions that warrant immediate investigation. In other words, and to put 
the inferential shoe on the other foot, if some estimates show great sensitivity to sample selection corrections 
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importance of having the right specification of the error distribution also applies even when one 
does have exclusion restrictions. 
As it happens, there are ways to construct exclusion restrictions in NESARC that have some 
a priori credibility. For instance, we know the day of the week on which the interview was conducted, 
and can condition on Friday, Saturday or Sunday interviews as potentially generating differential 
response. We also know how many trigger questions for other disorders a subject had answered 
affirmatively by the time the gambling trigger questions were asked, as one measure of how much 
time and “patience” had been taken up by that stage of the interview. Additional characteristics of 
the individual are available from baseline questions, and can be used to identify the sample selection 
equation. But such exclusion restrictions do not always arise in other surveys of gambling, even 
major epidemiological surveys. In general we recommend survey methods that do not require these 
sorts of tradeoffs (between finding attractive exclusion restrictions and reliance on the assumed 
stochastic structure for identification), but with existing surveys some tradeoffs are often needed. 
To set the stage for the evaluation of sample selection corrections, Table 2 and Figure 1 
show the estimated OR between GD and other psychiatric disorders when using the SNP approach 
rather than the parametric logistic specification. The total comorbidity estimates in Panel A of Table 
2 are comparable to those in Panel C of Table 1; similarly, the marginal comorbidity estimates in 
Panel B of Table 1 are comparable to those in Panel D of Table 1. With the SNP approach, 
however, the marginal comorbidities are not quite as close to 1 as with the parametric model. 
However, the same qualitative conclusions about the relationship of total and marginal comorbidity 
still apply. 
 
with these assumptions, and some decent effort to find good specifications, then one should not ignore that 
evidence because some of the parametric assumptions are untestable. 
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Figure 2 shows marginal effects of comorbidities when one undertakes sample selection 
corrections.19 The covariates used for this exercise are the same full set used in “model 3” of Petry et 
al. [2005], and are used for both equations.20 In addition, for the sample selection equation, we used 
a set of 29 variables reflecting recent events in the life of the respondent (e.g., family deaths or 
illness, job layoff, change in job, problems with neighbors or friends, criminal problems), height and 
weight, days of the week for the interview, and the number of previous trigger questions answered 
affirmatively. The variables reflecting life events only referred to the last year or last few months 
prior to the interview, and we are examining GD incidence across the lifetime frame. Table 3 
presents detailed estimates: for now, focus on Panel C, which shows OR with respect to the GD risk 
level. The effect of sample selection corrections is clear: the OR estimates are generally much lower. 
The estimated correlation between the two equations in the selection model, a measure of the 
importance of sample selection corrections, is -0.19.  
 
C. The Hierarchy of Gambling Disorders 
We turn to the hierarchy of gambling disorders, and inferences about general population 
prevalence. For example, the PGSI classifies samples into the categories “Non-Gambler,” “Low 
Risk for Problem Gambling,” “Moderate Risk for Problem Gambling,” and “Problem Gambler.”21 
Previous statistical evaluations of these hierarchies have not, to our knowledge, formally recognized 
 
19 We undertake sample selection corrections for GD, but not for the other psychiatric conditions. 
Instead we use the NESARC determinations of diagnosis. An important extension of our approach would be 
to simultaneously undertake sample selection corrections for all conditions and then assess comorbidity with 
respect to the corrected diagnoses for all conditions. 
20 Appendix B documents these covariates. 
21 The intended interpretation of risk here is not prospective (the probability of developing GD at 
some point in the future). Rather, it is intended as the risk that the respondent would currently be diagnosed 
as a DG if he or she participated in a full clinical interview with more reliable discrimination. 
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the ordered nature of the categories used in standard survey screens, which are derived directly from 
clinical screens. When several categories are ordered there are appropriate estimation procedures that 
use this information. The most popular are ordered probit models in which a latent index is 
estimated with “cut points” to identify the categories. We employ a SNP version of this type of 
ordered response model, developed by Stewart [2004] and extended by De Luca and Perotti [2011] 
to allow for sample selection corrections. We classify respondents into 4 categories: Non-Indicated 
individuals have no DSM-IV criteria or were not asked about them; Weakly Indicated individuals 
meeting 1 or 2 DSM-IV criteria; and Moderately Indicated individuals meeting 3 or 4 DSM-IV 
criteria.22 We retain the terminology used in the NESARC, and refer to individuals who meet 5 or 
more DSM-IV criteria as Pathological Gamblers. 
Figures 3 and 4 report estimates from a SNP ordered response model that ignores sample 
selection and estimates that correct for it. We use the estimates from these models to predict the 
fraction of the population in each of our four categories above. As a control, it is useful to note that 
the fractions of the population from the raw data found in each DSM-IV response number “bin” are 
recovered by the estimated ordered response model when we do not correct for sample selection: 
 
22 Most of the DSM criteria include the requirement that the symptoms be “clinically significant.” 
This is normally identified by questions asking if the symptom(s) led to any contacts with medical 
professionals, use of medication more than once, or led to interference with “life or activities.” For reasons of 
survey efficiency, these questions are normally asked only if the respondent meets some threshold level of 
symptoms. Hence one must be careful to recognize that anyone that has met fewer than the threshold level of 
symptoms will not have been asked about clinical significance (and, more generally, that these thresholds can 
be applied differently across general surveys, leading to apparent discrepancies in prevalence estimates, as 
stressed by Narrow, Rae, Robins and Reiger [2002]). There are no such criteria for GD evaluation in DSM 5 
since the symptoms themselves are viewed as evidence of “clinically significant impairment or distress” 
(American Psychiatric Association [2013; p. 585]). However, DSM-III, DSM-IV and DSM 5 all contain 
exceptions for anyone whose gambling behavior is not “better explained” by a manic episode. This exclusion 
criterion is also only asked in surveys if someone met the threshold level of symptoms. For NESARC there 
are only 25 (7) out of 68 respondents to this question who said that any (all) of the times they gambled 
happened “during a period when they felt extremely excited, extremely irritable or easily annoyed.” These 
respondents constitute only 0.042 (0.016) of a percentage point of the population. For consistency of 
interpretation across the hierarchy, we do not apply this exception. 
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94.6% Non-Indicated, 4.0% Weakly Indicated, 0.9% Moderately Indicated, and 0.4% Pathological 
Gamblers. Hence we know that the base statistical model we have estimated is not biased relative to 
the raw data, as we have binned it. These base predictions are referred to as the Uncorrected 
predictions in Figures 3 and 4. We therefore find a common result, that the prevalence of 
Pathological Gambling is around 0.4%. To the extent that our “Moderately Indicated” individuals 
are taken to approximately correspond to what some researchers (e.g., Pietrzak et al. [2007], Algeria 
et al. [2009] and Nower et al. [2013]) categorize as sub-clinical “Problem Gamblers,” the sum of the 
two most troubled categories produces a figure of 1.3%, familiar from much of the GD prevalence 
literature. The Corrected predictions, allowing for sample selection biases, are again dramatic. The 
fraction of Weakly Indicated increases from 4.0% to 8.3%, the fraction of Moderately Indicated 
increases from 0.9% to 3.9%, and the fraction of Pathological Gamblers increases from 0.4% to 
3.8%. Hence prevalence of Pathological Gamblers plus Moderately Indicated is 7.7% when sample 
selection bias is corrected, compared to 1.3% when no correction is applied. 
It is worth stressing that this result obtains not simply because the sample selection model 
predicts that more people will get through the gateway of the trigger question, although it does 
predict that. The observed fraction being selected by their responses to that question is 27%, and the 
predicted fraction from the sample selection model who would have been selected if they answered 
the trigger question accurately (according to the empirical specification) is 58%.23 The issue is also a 
 
23 Because the predicted fraction to be selected exceeds the observed fraction, one might just assume 
that the selection equation is mis-specified, and this is the simple explanation for our findings of a higher 
prevalence of individuals at risk. However, the predicted probability of being selected in the sample selection 
model is the predicted sample conditional on covariates plus an error term for that selection equation. In the 
usual parametric sample selection specification this error term is assumed to be zero, so these observed and 
predicted fractions should be more or less the same. However, the semi-nonparametric specification does not 
assume this error term to be zero, as emphasized by DeLuca and Perotti [2011; p.218]. Hence the predicted 
fraction could be larger or smaller than the observed fraction. This point further illustrates how the sample 
selection model benefits from not having to impose a parametric stochastic structure. 
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matter of which profile of subjects is predicted to be selected. The sample selection model predicts 
more of the types of people predicted to flag more DSM criteria, and fewer of the type of people 
predicted to flag fewer DSM criteria. Thus sample selection is, as emphasized by Heckman 
[1976][1979], fundamentally an issue about allowing for unobserved heterogeneity.24 
Figure 4 displays the distribution of predictions, with and without sample selection 
corrections, as well as indicators of the statistical significance of the effect of sample selection. 
Consider the top left panel in Figure 4, for the “Non-Indicated” category of gambling risk. The 
Uncorrected distribution of predictions reflects the results of simulating 100 random draws for each 
NESARC respondent from the predicted marginal probability of Non-Indicated, using the estimated 
SNP ordered probit model. Each random draw is from a normal distribution whose mean is the 
point estimate of the marginal probability for that subject, and whose standard deviation is the 
standard error of that point estimate, again for that subject. Thus the 100 random draws for each 
subject reflect individual-specific predictions, taking into account the statistical uncertainty of the 
prediction. The Corrected distribution of predictions is generated similarly, using the estimated SNP 
ordered probit model allowing for sample selection.  Since there are 43,093 respondents to 
NESARC, each of the kernel densities in Figure 4 reflect 4,309,300 predictions. 
These densities in Figure 4 allow one to see the average effects shown in Figure 3, the 
decrease in predicted Non-Indicated respondents from 0.946 to 0.839, but also to visualize the 
 
24 The survey of gambling disorders in the Canadian Community Health Survey (CCHS) of Mental 
Health and Well-Being of 2002 illustrates this point perfectly. Their gateway questions resulted in only 1,754 
of 36,884 subjects being asked the full set of questions from the Canadian Problem Gambling Index (CPGI), 
the full clinical assessment protocol from which the PGSI short field screen is derived. In the raw data one 
observes 2.8%, 1.5% and 0.5% classified as Low Risk, Moderate Risk and Problem Gambler, respectively, 
using the categories defined by Statistics Canada for the CCHS. Thus 4.8% are classified as “at risk.” After 
sample selection corrections these become 0.6%, 1.7% and 2.3%, respectively, or 4.6% in total. So virtually 
the same fraction are classified as “at risk,” but the composition is more heavily weighted toward those at 
greatest risk for GD.  
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precision of this difference. A t-test for each NESARC respondent generates a p-value for the 
hypothesis that the predicted marginal probability is the same with and without sample selection 
corrections. The 90th, 95th and 99th percentiles of this distribution of 43,093 p-values are tabulated in 
the top-left panel of Figure 4. We find that the predicted decrease in No Risk is statistically significant, 
in the sense that the 99th percentile of these p-values is 0.0001 or lower.25 Similarly, the average 
predicted increases in the Weakly Indicated, Moderately Indicated and Pathological Gambler 
categories (Figure 3) are also statistically significant, with the 99th percentile of p-values again being 
0.001 lower in each case (Figure 4). 
Figure 5 shows a decomposition of the processes underlying the sample selection correction, 
to better understand the logic. For each category of gambling problem or risk, it displays the 
conditional probability of being classified in that category depending on whether the subject is predicted 
to be “selected out” or “selected in” by the trigger question. For instance, if someone is predicted not 
to be selected in, the probability of them being classified as Weakly Indicated is 0.142; if that person 
is predicted to be selected in, the probability of them being classified as Weakly Indicated is 0.040. 
Since the predicted probability of being selected in is 0.580, this implies that the weighted probability 
of being in the Weakly Indicated bin is [0.580 × 0.040] + [(1-0.580) × 0.142] = 0.083, which is the 
value shown in Figure 4 for being Weakly Indicated with sample selection correction. 
Table 3 shows the predicted OR with respect to other psychiatric disorders for each category 
of the gambling hierarchy model with and without sample selection corrections. For each category of 
gambling problem or risk the OR for each disorder is much smaller when corrections are made for 
sample selection. Again, the upper bound of the 95% confidence interval with sample selection 
 
25 The percentile value is purely descriptive, as a summary statistic for 43,093 p-values. The p-value is 
the inferential statistic. 
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corrections is always below the lower bound of the same confidence interval without sample 
selection corrections. 
 
2. Sample Selection Bias and Gambling Survey Screens 
 Survey screens have been traditionally designed to provisionally identify individuals who are 
likely to meet clinical criteria for GD. This has various implications for the design and format of the 
survey questions, which have evolved over time. Here we evaluate some of the issues that flow from 
that design objective as those relate to the use of trigger questions, ending with constructive 
suggestions to mitigate the sample selection biases such questions generate. 
 
 A. The Evolution of Trigger Questions 
 The history of the South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS) provides an important exemplar of 
these origins and concerns. The initial stages of the development of the instrument involved South 
Oaks Hospital patients already admitted for some alcohol or drug dependency, and was prompted by 
knowledge from previous clinical treatment of the correlations between these addictions and 
gambling problems (Lesieur, Blume and Zoppa [1986]). In the initial pilots of screen designs, if “the 
patient denied any gambling, he or she was not interviewed further” (Lesieur and Blume [1987; p. 
1185]). On the other hand, later care and conversations might reveal that some deception had 
occurred, in which case the patient was re-interviewed (ibid.). The pilot questions, and the 
subsequent finalized SOGS, were directly motivated by the criteria stipulated in DSM-III (American 
Psychiatric Association [1987]), albeit with modifications to focus less on late stage, “desperation 
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phase,” symptoms.26 
The final instrument, presented in Lesieur and Blume [1987; Appendix 1], was cross-
validated by being given to 213 members of Gamblers Anonymous, 384 university students, and 152 
hospital employees. The logic of this cross-validation was that the first group are self-identified as 
having gambling problems, while the last two groups were presumptively expected not to be DGs. 
Hence the detection of GD propensities of 98%, 5% and 1.3%, respectively, by the SOGS response 
scores was viewed as providing evidence of 2% false negatives, 5% tentative false positives, and 1.3% 
tentative false positives, respectively. 
The clinical origins of SOGS did not mean that it automatically translated into an ideal 
epidemiological instrument, and indeed it was subsequently largely supplanted from that use by other 
instruments, such as the PGSI, thought to be more accurate. An important early warning was raised 
by one of the SOGS authors, Lesieur [1994], who carefully noted how seemingly minor changes in 
sampling procedures and question wording might completely change the interpretation, and claims 
of validity, of the instrument. 
An important exception to the emphasis on clinical objectives for GD survey instruments is 
offered by Currie, Miller, Hodgins and Wang [2009], who argue that many gamblers who report no 
occurrent or historical gambling problem might be “at risk” in a broader public health sense. That is, 
someone identified in a survey as having no gambling problems might have a heightened propensity 
to engage in other behaviors that predict vulnerability to GD, and for that reason might be of 
interest to public health forecasting. 
There is no mention of a trigger question in the first epidemiological applications of SOGS 
 
26 The original DSM-III criteria stressed disruption of personal, family and employment activities. The 
revised criteria in DSM-III-R added physiological symptoms such as withdrawal problems. 
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in the United States reported by Volberg and Steadman [1988][1989], or in the revised SOGS 
surveys for New Zealand reported by Abbot and Volberg [1996]. One of the first surveys to have 
used a trigger question appears to be Dickerson, Baron, Hong and Cottrell [1996]. Since then, the 
use of trigger questions has become standard, particularly in large-scale epidemiological surveys, as 
the review of national prevalence studies by Williams, Volberg and Stevens [2012] shows. There are 
continuing debates about the nature of those trigger questions, but they generally concern whether 
participants should be asked about their gambling over lifetime or only past-year frames. There is 
also critical discussion about whether monetary loss thresholds should figure in questions. Stone et 
al. [2015] emphasize these issues, while also signaling awareness of potential sample selection bias 
introduced by use of trigger questions, but do not address measures to explicitly correct for it. 
A somewhat aggressive defense of trigger questions is provided by the Australian 
Productivity Commission [1999; volume 3, page F14]: 
The [Australian] National Gambling Survey did not administer the SOGS to all respondents –  
indeed there are good reasons why gambling surveys do not ask the problem gambling screen 
of all participants: 
• questions about what people do when they gamble are clearly of no relevance to non 
gamblers. In the National Gambling Survey, respondents were classified as a non 
gambler only after they had answered ‘no’ to thirteen separate questions about 
whether they had participated in any of twelve specified gambling activities and an 
‘any other’ gambling category. Hence, this detail of questioning should reliably 
identify a genuine non gambler. 
• a problem gambling screen is of little or no relevance to infrequent gamblers because 
their gambling is very unlikely to be associated with problematic behaviour; but 
• it is most appropriate to administer a problem gambling screen to those respondents 
whose gambling has a greater likelihood of giving rise to problems. 
Indeed, as the NORC [National Opinion Research Center] study (Gerstein et al. 1999) 
noted: 
We chose to use these “filter” questions in the national survey after our 
pretesting indicated that nongamblers and very infrequent gamblers grew 
impatient with repeated questions about gambling-related problems (p. 19). 
For these reasons, the problem gambling instrument was administered only to that subset of 
gamblers considered most likely to experience problems related to their gambling – all 
‘regular’ gamblers as defined by filter 2 and ‘big spending’ and other non-regular gamblers 
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captured by filter 3. 
 
We would rephrase the last sentence as follows: for these reasons, the GD screen used by Gerstein 
et al. [1999] was administered only to that subset of gamblers considered most likely on the basis of 
ex ante theory to experience gambling problems. As we discuss below, best-practice survey design 
should bring prior theory to bear, but for the purpose of gathering data that contributes to modeling 
sample exclusions, rather than as a basis for filtering out some information altogether.  
 The form of the trigger question is raised as an issue by Volberg and Williams [2012; p. 9] as 
follows: 
A final important methodological variation that is known to have a significant impact 
on problem gambling prevalence rates concerns the threshold for administering 
problem gambling questions. Engaging in any gambling in the past year is a common 
criterion used to administer questions about problem gambling. However, Williams 
and Volberg [2009][2010] found that this criterion results in too many false positives 
on problem gambling screening instruments (as assessed by subsequent clinical 
assessment). These false positives can be significantly reduced by (a) using a higher 
threshold for the designation of problem gambling (i.e., CPGI27 5+ versus CPGI 
3+); and/or (b) requiring a minimal frequency of gambling in the past year (i.e., at 
least 10 times on some format) before administering problem gambling screens; 
and/or (c) resolving these cases of inconsistent gambling behaviour by automatically 
asking people to explain the  discrepancy between their problem gambling 
classification in the absence of significant gambling behaviour, or intensive gambling 
involvement in the absence of reports of problems. 
 
Indeed, Williams and Volberg [2009] conducted a careful evaluation of three survey administration 
features, and report disturbing effects on inferred GD prevalence: 
• they found that just referring in the introduction to a “gambling survey” rather than a “health 
and recreation survey” caused a 133% increase in estimated GD prevalence; 
• using face-to-face interviews rather than telephone interviews led to a 55% increase; and 
 
27 The citation, strictly speaking, refers to the PGSI, the short scored field screen of the CPGI. 
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• using a trigger question with a cutoff of C$300 in annual gambling losses, compared to the 
trigger of any gambling in the past year, would have implied a 42% decrease. 
The conjectured rationale for the first effect is that gamblers like taking gambling surveys, which 
economists regard as a classic sample selection effect. The second effect is simply demographic, and 
would be easy to correct with the right sample weights in the population: men respond more to one 
mode of interview than women, and men gamble much more than women. No explanation for the 
final effect is offered, although Williams and Volberg [2009; p.112] note that one of their subjects 
who was in this category revealed an interesting issue: 
There was one individual with a CPGI score of 12 despite not reporting any past year 
gambling. It is interesting to note that this person reported having a history of 
problem gambling prior to the past 12 months, which may have influenced his 
responses to the CPGI past year questions. 
 
This subject, it seems, had gambling under control in the year before the survey, but based on earlier 
history might be conjectured to still be vulnerable to GD under certain conditions. Such a fact might 
not be clinically important at point of presentation, but should be relevant to public health 
forecasting, or to regulatory officials deciding whether to license new gaming facilities. 
 Possible ambiguity of some threshold questions also raises sampling concerns. Blaszczynski, 
Dumlao and Lange [1997] cite evidence suggesting ambiguity in interpreting the question “How 
much money do you spend on gambling?” Over five case study vignettes considered by their 
subjects the most popular interpretation was the net amount of money spent in a session. But other 
subjects interpreted the same vignette in terms of initial stake, turnover, or even just losses, as well as 
some random responses disconnected to the information. Blaszczynski et al. [1997; p. 249ff.] suggest 
that the most relevant estimate of gambling expenditure is net expenditure. [...] It is 
recommended that future prevalence studies provide adequate instructions on how 
to calculate the net expenditure by drawing subjects’ attention to the difference 
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between amounts invested and the residual at the conclusion of each session. It is 
suggested that wins reinvested during particular individual sessions should be 
ignored. 
 
A similar issue was examined by Wood and Williams [2007], who evaluated 12 different ways of 
asking this question, and concluded (p. 72) that, “In general, retrospective estimates of gambling 
expenditures appear unreliable.” To be sure, some ways of asking the question elicited more reliable 
responses, by some sensible metrics. And it does not follow that other forms of detecting a gambling 
threshold suffer the same ambiguities. For instance, asking if someone has gambled five times in the 
past year may be easier than asking them to tell you how much they spent on gambling in the past 
year, or even if they recall losing a certain amount of money in any one day in the past year. 
 There is widespread recognition of the difficulty of asking “how much money have you lost” 
questions. Some DGs erase prior losses within a gambling session from cognitive book-keeping as 
soon as they win; Rachlin [1990][2000] and Rachlin et al. [2015] argue that this is one of the 
characteristics that distinguishes DGs from self-controlled gamblers. Concern with this issue led 
Sharp et al. [2012], in a South African prevalence study, to pose the question as follows: 
Thinking about the last time you participated in [ASK FOR EACH GAME EVER 
PLAYED, FROM A PREVIOUS QUESTION], approximately how much money 
would you say you staked on that occasion – that is the total amount in rands you put 
down to bet on that activity during that whole evening or day, not the amount you 
won and not the amount you ended up with at the end? Please take your time to 
think carefully about this.  
  
They found that subjects identified as DGs based on their PGSI scores tended to take significantly 
longer to answer this question than people who reported regular gambling but did not score in the 
GD range.28 
 
28 Sharp et al. [2012] further tried to encourage accurate responses by asking this question separately 
for each game the respondent reports playing. Since they know mean general house advantages for game 
types as set by South African regulations, this allows them to compute expected losses to the extent that 
subjects reported expenditures in the strict sense of that word. Of course this approach was profligate with 
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 B. Mitigating the Effects of Trigger Questions 
 How might one mitigate some of the effects on prevalence estimates of survey screens that 
use trigger questions, whatever the form of the question? 
 First, if possible one could design surveys that do not naively assume that trigger questions 
lead to no sample selection bias, and indeed we have done that in Denmark as a result of the 
concerns identified here (see Harrison, Jessen, Lau and Ross [2018]). In this study, questions based 
on two different loss threshold quanta were asked of respondents at the end of the survey that was 
administered to all participants. This allowed analysis to compare the actual estimation of GD 
prevalence, across all levels in the hierarchy of risk, with the hypothetical estimates that would have 
been generated had those who failed to meet one threshold or the other been assigned to a “Non-
Gambler” or “No Risk” category due to being excluded from further screening. We recognize that 
this can only be done if a few specific psychiatric disorders are the focus of the survey, given 
limitations on time needed for subject responses.  
 Several surveys have come close to this ideal, by employing extremely “light” trigger 
questions that only exclude from the sample those that have never engaged in any gambling over 
some period, including the mere purchase of a lottery ticket. One example is the British Gambling 
Prevalence Survey (BGPS) of 2010, which asked PGSI and DSM-IV questions for 73% of their entire 
sample of 7,756: see Wardle et al. [2011]. Figure 6 shows that although there are differences in 
prevalence when correcting for sample selection bias using the DSM-IV-based screen, they are not 
 
subjects’ time, which can cause them to become impatient and consequently respond less accurately to 
questions in general. 
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statistically significant or even quantitatively significant for policy purposes.29 The analysis of the 
BGPS also demonstrates that the sample selection correction does not always increase the fraction 
of the population predicted to be at risk: in this case that fraction drops from 5.0% to 4.8% with 
correction. 
 Another example of the value of asking an extremely light trigger question is the first wave 
of the Victorian Gambling Survey (VGS) of 2008, which asked PGSI questions for 75% of their entire 
sample of 15,000: see Billi et al. [2014][2015] and Stone et al. [2015].30 Again, Figure 7 shows that 
although there are economically significant differences in prevalence overall when correcting for 
sample selection bias using the PGSI, the differences for the most important categories of 
Moderately Indicated and Pathological Gambler31 are not statistically significant32 or quantitatively 
significant for policy purposes. Of course, if the policy objective is to identify demographic slices 
that might be at risk, one would need to go beneath these aggregate population prevalence estimates 
to know if there is a sample selection bias. 
 On the other hand, the same VGS illustrates the risks of using additional threshold questions 
in order to reduce respondent time during the interview.33 Starting with the 75% of the sample that 
 
29 The U.K. National Centre for Social Research, the Gambling Commission, and the UK Data 
Archive bear no responsibility for our analysis or interpretation of the BGPS. Figure B1 in Appendix B 
documents the claim about statistical insignificance of the differences. 
30 Stone et al. [2015] also present results from the Swedish Longitudinal Gambling Survey. The data from 
that study are not available for replication or review (Ulla Romild, Public Health Agency of Sweden; personal 
communication, October 23, 2016). 
31 For consistency we repeat the categories of gambling problems and risk used in the NESARC data 
analysis (Figures 3, 4 and 5) rather than the categories reported by the original BGPS and VGS reports from 
the DSM-IV, PGSI, and NODS screens. In Figure 6 the original category is “Problem Gambling,” with a 
DSM-IV score of 3 or more. In Figure 7 the original categories are “Low Risk,” “Moderate Risk,” and 
“Problem Gambler,” respectively; as noted earlier, the PGSI uses “Problem Gambler” as synonymous with 
the DSM-IV’s “Pathological Gambler” (and, therefore, the DSM 5’s “Disordered Gambler.” In Figure 8 the 
original categories are “At Risk,” “Problem Gambler,” and “Pathological Gambler,” respectively. 
32 Figure B2 in Appendix B documents the claim about statistical insignificance of the differences. 
33 Another example of additional threshold questions being used is the Canadian Community Health 
Survey of Mental Health and Well-Being of 2002. Of the sample of 36,984, 24.6% said that they had not 
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had gambled at all in the last 12 months, these surveyors added 1,057 individuals who had gambled 
before then, to arrive at a lifetime sample of gamblers of 81%. But they then employed an additional 
pre-screening procedure when applying the National Opinion Research Center DSM (NODS) 
screen of Gerstein et al. [1999] to measure lifetime gambling prevalence. This procedure asks 5 
questions about gambling behavior, and only follows up with the additional questions of the full 
NODS instrument if someone responds affirmatively to one of those 5 pre-screening questions. 
This procedure drops the VGS sample by 11,075, so that we end up with only 8.5% of the full 
sample being evaluated with the NODS instrument. Unfortunately, this procedure is not statistically 
innocent: as Figure 8 shows, it leads to a statistically and quantitatively significant sample selection 
bias when inferring lifetime prevalence.34 The fraction of the Victorian adult population that is 
indicated as being at risk of GD jumps from 5.6% to 10.5% after correcting for sample selection 
bias, and the fraction of DGs increases from 0.9% to 2.3%. 
 Second, one can design surveys that use criteria for GD that do not rely on historical 
gambling experience to measure whether someone is at risk, as is the focus of virtually every trigger 
question we find in the literature. To the extent that one has a theoretically motivated structural 
model of the nexus of causal factors for GD, some of which may be present in the absence of 
gambling opportunities in a person’s environment, one can gain information about a respondent’s 
risk for developing GD that is independent of any historical gambling behavior meeting a threshold 
 
engaged in any of 13 gambling activities in the past year. Then 46.3% of the total sample was not asked the 
full set of CPGI questions because they had only gambled between 1 and 5 times, at most, for each of the 13 
activities. And then 24.0% of the sample was not asked the full set of CPGI questions because they said that 
they were a non-gambler on the first CPGI question. There were 98 subjects that refused to answer the initial 
questions about gambling activity, resulting in only 1,759 being asked the full set of questions and having any 
chance of being scored as “at risk.” These deviations from the CPGI screen, and the PGSI index derived 
from it, were “approved by the authors of the scale” (Statistics Canada [2004; p.19]). 
34 Figure B3 in Appendix B documents the claim about statistical significance of the differences. 
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of frequency or financial loss. Note that in such modeling, the sense of “risk” is prospective, in 
contrast to the current risk of misdiagnosis that is operationalized in the PGSI and in DSM-based 
screens. The Focal Adult Gambling Screen (FLAGS) designed by Schellinck et al. [2015a][2015b] is 
an instance of such a screen, which has been used by industry analysts around the world, but has 
been deployed by no prevalence study prior to the use of it by Harrison, Jessen, Lau and Ross 
[2018]) in Denmark. The value of prospective risk forecasting for policy around gambling facility 
licensing should be obvious, and this policy goal naturally complements the point we are making 
about using trigger questions that are not reliant on past gambling experience. When considering 
jurisdictions that have had bans on certain forms of gambling, or where the transactions costs of 
engaging in gambling have changed, it is quite possible that someone exhibits traits that would lead 
them to be at risk of gambling problems in different circumstances than they have experienced.35 
Mitigation of sample selection bias and enhanced policy guidance might thus be achieved by the 
same research design strategy. 
 Third, where there is a need for some sort of trigger question or questions to avoid taking 
too much time in surveys, one can build in random treatments to make it easier to identify sample 
selection bias. These treatments would be conditions that affect the likelihood of someone 
participating in a full survey, or engaging in deception due to sensitivity around a question. An 
 example of the former would be financial incentives for participating in surveys, of the kind 
employed in some surveys and experiments.36 An example of the latter would be any one of a myriad 
 
35 To take a stark example, assume that gambling is illegal until one reaches a certain age of consent. 
Surveys of individuals who have just reached that age would show nobody at risk, but of course that says 
nothing about the future propensity of the individual to have gambling problems. 
36 For an example from surveys, consider the follow-up to the longitudinal Movement to 
Opportunity (MTO) field experiment, in which 30% of the sample was randomly assigned to more intensive 
follow-up; see Orr et al. [2003; Exhibit B, §B1.3] and DiNardo, McCrary and Sanbonmatsu [2006]. This 
randomized follow-up was in addition to the primary randomization to treatment: (i) a housing voucher with 
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of survey techniques for using “randomized response” methods to ensure that subjects are not 
revealing with certainty some sensitive information in response to a question.37 
 Fourth, one could recruit subjects from an Administrative Registry, so that one can again 
better control for sample selection biases by knowing characteristics of all of those recruited, 
whether or not they agree to participate. This is not a general option, since few non-Scandinavian 
countries have general registries, although recruiting from a Census may suffice if access to 
characteristics of the individuals recruited is possible. 
 
 3. Conclusions 
 Measurement of the population prevalence of the risk of gambling problems, and the 
psychiatric disorders with which they are correlated, play critical roles in public health policy and 
policy around the licensing of casinos and other gambling facilities. It should make a substantive 
difference to policy assessment and forecasts of consequence whether the fraction “at risk” of being 
current DGs is 1.3% or 7.7%, and that is the pure effect of allowing for sample selection bias in the 
application of a major, widely-cited, and conventional survey of the U.S. population. In fact, one 
conjecture as to why investigation of GD prevalence was dropped from follow-up waves of the 
NESARC in the United States and from the Mental Health module of the Canadian Community 
 
some strings attached and some counseling, (ii) a housing voucher with no strings attached and no counseling, 
and (iii) a control group. This additional randomization to more intensive follow-up had virtually no effect on 
results, since the effective response rates for the long-term MTO follow-up were around 90%, and similar 
across primary treatments. This methodological step was striking, since it provided some controlled basis for 
inferring sample attrition, which is formally identical to sample selection, albeit in the opposite direction 
(selecting out of the longitudinal sample). For an example from field experiments, see Harrison, Il and Lau 
[2014], where subjects were offered different non-risky incentives to participate and effects on measured risk 
aversion assessed after correcting for sample selection. 
37 See Warner [1965] for the original idea, and Blair, Imai and Zhou [2015] for a recent review and 
application of variants. There are other non-randomized survey methods for encouraging truthful responses 
to sensitive questions. 
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Health Survey is that the uncorrected population prevalence was too low to justify resources and 
interview time asking the questions. Hence it becomes “settled” belief that the prevalence of GD is 
tiny, and no data are ever then collected to question that belief. It would represent a shameful failure 
of linkage between best research practice and best policy design if these statistical biases in 
measurement of population prevalence drove substantive decisions concerning the regulation of 
gambling or the allocation of resources toward the treatment of GD. 
 One immediate substantive implication of our findings is to ask if comparable biases distort 
inferences about other psychiatric disorders, since prevalence surveys for every major psychiatric 
disorder typically use comparable trigger questions.38 Although it is conceivable that the distortion 
could be in any direction, our a priori expectation would be that the distortions lead to 
understatements of prevalence across the board, given the sensitive nature of the trigger questions. 
  
 
38 For example, Harrison [2017] applies the same approach to evaluate the population prevalence of 
nicotine dependence, which is DSM-IV code 305.10, and finds comparable biases in the United States using 
NESARC. 
 30 
 
 Table 1: Logistic Odds Ratio Calculations for Pathological Gambling 
 Odds 
Ratio 
Standard 
Error 
t for 
H0: OR = 1 
 
p-value 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
 
A. Total Effects with Logistic Model and No Covariates 
Alcohol 6.1 0.52 21.1 < 0.001 5.1 7.2 
Drug 5.2 0.61 14.3 < 0.001 4.2 6.6 
Nicotine 7.0 0.62 22.0 < 0.001 5.8 8.3 
Mood 4.8 0.44 17.3 < 0.001 4.0 5.8 
Anxiety 3.4 0.32 13.1 < 0.001 2.8 4.1 
Personality 9.0 0.81 24.2 < 0.001 7.4 10.7 
 
B. Marginal Effects with Logistic Model and No Covariates 
Alcohol 2.6 0.19 13.1 < 0.001 2.2 3.0 
Drug 1.3 0.14 2.2 0.03 1.0 1.6 
Nicotine 2.7 0.21 13.2 < 0.001 2.4 3.2 
Mood 1.7 0.21 4.2 < 0.001 1.3 2.1 
Anxiety 1.1 0.13 0.9 0.39 0.9 1.4 
Personality 4.1 0.65 8.8 < 0.001 2.9 5.6 
 
C. Total Effects with Logistic Model and Covariates 
Alcohol 5.2 0.48 17.8 < 0.001 4.3 6.2 
Drug 3.9 0.45 11.9 < 0.001 3.1 4.9 
Nicotine 6.1 0.51 21.4 < 0.001 5.1 7.2 
Mood 5.1 0.52 16.3 < 0.001 4.2 6.3 
Anxiety 3.8 0.35 14.5 < 0.001 3.2 4.6 
Personality 7.8 0.68 23.6 < 0.001 6.6 9.3 
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D. Marginal Effects with Logistic Model and Covariates 
Alcohol 2.2 0.18 9.4 < 0.001 1.8 2.6 
Drug 1.1 0.13 1.2 0.24 0.9 1.4 
Nicotine 2.8 0.22 13.5 < 0.001 2.4 3.3 
Mood 1.9 0.26 5.0 < 0.001 1.5 2.5 
Anxiety 1.3 0.15 2.1 0.04 1.0 1.6 
Personality 3.7 0.58 8.4 < 0.001 2.7 5.1 
 
E. Marginal Odds Ratios for Demographic Covariates with Logistic Model 
Female 0.4 0.04 -9.3 < 0.001 0.3 0.5 
Black 3.1 0.25 14.1 < 0.001 2.7 3.7 
Hispanic 0.9 0.11 -1.2 0.24 0.7 1.1 
Age 30-44 0.9 0.17 -0.3 0.77 0.7 1.4 
Age 45-64 1.3 0.22 1.7 0.09 0.9 1.8 
Age 65+ 1.1 0.18 0.7 0.51 0.8 1.5 
Separated 1.5 0.15 4.3 < 0.001 1.2 1.8 
Midwest 1.1 0.14 0.8 0.45 0.8 1.4 
South 0.9 0.10 -0.9 0.35 0.7 1.1 
West 1.7 0.22 4.0 < 0.001 1.3 2.2 
High School 0.9 0.13 -0.1 0.91 0.7 1.3 
Some College 1.0 0.08 -0.3 0.78 0.8 1.1 
College 0.5 0.07 -5.3 < 0.001 0.4 0.6 
Graduate 0.7 0.13 -2.2 0.03 0.4 0.9 
Income 2 0.9 0.12 -0.4 0.72 0.7 1.2 
Income 3 0.6 0.06 -5.3 < 0.001 0.5 0.7 
Income 4 1.5 0.17 3.3 0.002 1.2 1.9 
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 Table 2: Semi-Nonparametric Odds Ratio Calculations for Pathological Gambling 
 Odds Ratio Standard Error 95% Confidence Interval 
 
A. Total Effects with No Covariates 
Alcohol 6.0 < 0.001 6.0 6.0 
Drug 6.2 < 0.001 6.2 6.2 
Nicotine 6.7 < 0.001 6.7 6.7 
Mood 4.8 < 0.001 4.8 4.8 
Anxiety 4.2 < 0.001 4.2 4.2 
Personality 8.2 < 0.001 8.2 8.2 
 
B. Marginal Effects with No Covariates 
Alcohol 4.2 0.004 4.2 4.3 
Drug 1.6 0.001 1.6 1.6 
Nicotine 3.3 0.003 3.3 3.3 
Mood 2.4 0.002 2.4 2.4 
Anxiety 2.3 0.001 2.3 2.3 
Personality 4.6 0.005 4.6 4.7 
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Table 3: Semi-Nonparametric Odds Ratio Calculations for Gambling Risks 
 Each standard error is less than 0.002, so 95% confidence intervals are the same 
 Odds Ratio with No 
Sample Selection Correction 
Odds Ratio with No 
Sample Selection Correction 
A. Weakly Indicated 
Alcohol 1.95 1.02 
Drug 1.25 1.02 
Nicotine 1.72 1.03 
Mood 1.50 1.05 
Anxiety 1.48 1.04 
Personality 2.01 1.07 
   
B. Moderately Indicated 
Alcohol 2.91 1.10 
Drug 1.42 1.06 
Nicotine 2.40 1.14 
Mood 1.91 1.24 
Anxiety 1.88 1.18 
Personality 3.08 1.35 
   
C. Pathological Gambler 
Alcohol 4.25 1.18 
Drug 1.60 1.12 
Nicotine 3.27 1.26 
Mood 2.40 1.47 
Anxiety 2.35 1.34 
Personality 4.65 1.75 
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Appendix A: Classifying Pathological Gamblers in NESARC (NOT FOR PUBLICATION) 
 
 The NESARC provides information on responses to 15 questions about gambling, which 
map into the 10 diagnostic criteria of DSM-IV. There appears to be no public documentation about 
how that mapping occurs, although it does seem “obvious” on an a priori basis, as explained below. 
On the other hand, there is an apparent mis-match between the mapped classifications from the raw 
data on these 15 questions and the “summary classification” of pathological gambling provided by 
the NESARC data files. This is of some significance because it appears that every researcher that has 
used the NESARC data has used this summary classification, rather than re-generating it from the 
ground up. 
 
 That summary measure is provided in section 13 of the data file codebook: 
 
We focus here on lifetime questions, although the same issues apply to questions about the last 12 
months. 
 
 The 15 NESARC questions are displayed on the next two pages. Pay attention to the Check 
Item 12.1 at the bottom of section 2, containing these 15 questions: 
 
 
 
What this means is that someone is declared to be PG if they answer 5 of the 15 NESARC 
questions, not if they meet 10 of the DSM-IV criteria that these 15 question responses map into. 
This is in direct conflict with how the PG classification is defined in the papers reporting data from 
the NESARC. For example, Petry, Stinson and Grant [2005; p. 567] say that “Lifetime AUDADIS-
IV diagnoses of pathological gambling required the respondent to meet at least 5 of the 10 DSM-IV 
criteria in the 12-month period preceding the interview and/or before that 12-month period. Fifteen 
symptom items operationalized the 10 pathological gambling criteria.” 
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 A3 
 
 
 
As it happens, it is relatively easy to see how the 15 questions map into the 10 DSM-IV 
criteria. From page 618 of the DSM-IV Manual, these 10 criteria are listed below, and Table A1 
shows the 15 NESARC questions and the DSM criteria number they map into. 
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 Table A1: Mapping from 15 NESARC Gambling Criteria to 10 DSM-IV Criteria 
 
 
NESARC Gambling Questions DSM Criteria 
(1) Gamble to get out of a bad mood – like feeling nervous, sad or down? 5 
(2) Gamble to forget your problems? 5 
(3) More than once try to quit or cut down on your gambling, but found you 
couldn’t do it? 
3 
(4) Find that you had to increase the amount of money you would gamble to 
keep it exciting? 
2 
(5) Spend a lot of time gambling, planning your bets or studying the odds? 1 
(6) Spend a lot of time thinking about ways to get money together so you 
could gamble? 
1 
(7) Spend a lot of time thinking about the times when you won or lost? 1 
(8) Have job or school trouble because of your gambling – like missing too 
much work, being demoted at work, losing your job or dropping out 
of school? 
9 
(8a) Break up or come close to breaking up with anyone who was important to 
you because of your gambling? 
9 
(9) Try to keep your family or friends from knowing how much you gamble? 7 
(10) Have such financial trouble as a result of your gambling that you had to 
get help with living expenses from family, friends or welfare? 
10 
(11) Find that you become restless, irritable or anxious when trying to quit or 
cut down in your gambling? 
4 
(12) Raise gambling money by writing a bad check, signing someone else’s 
name to a check, stealing, cashing someone else’s check or in some 
other illegal way? 
8 
(13) Find that you had to gamble again as soon as possible after LOSING in 
order to win back your losses? 
6 
(14) Find that you had to gamble again as soon as possible after WINNING in 
order to win more? 
2 
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 If one undertakes this mapping for each individual in the survey, there are actually 207 PG 
subjects in these data, not 195 as tabulated in section 14 of the data. Here is a tabulation: 
 
 Number of | 
 PG DSM-IV | 
  criteria |      pg_lifetime 
       met |         0        Yes |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
         0 |    40,814          0 |    40,814  
         1 |     1,251          0 |     1,251  
         2 |       448          0 |       448  
         3 |       257          0 |       257  
         4 |       107          9 |       116  
         5 |        19         59 |        78  
         6 |         1         42 |        43  
         7 |         1         39 |        40  
         8 |         0         28 |        28  
         9 |         0         13 |        13  
        10 |         0          5 |         5  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
     Total |    42,898        195 |    43,093  
 
We see that 9 individuals were incorrectly defined to be PG when they only met 4 of the DSM-IV 
criteria, but that 21 individuals were defined as not being PG when they did indeed meet 5 or more 
of the DSM-IV. We do not know that all of these 21 were incorrectly defined, since we need to decide 
whether or not to check the DSM-IV exclusionary criterion, that they did not suffer from Manic 
Episodes. 
 
 As it happens, the NESARC has information on that criteria, and 3 of these 21 did exhibit 
such Manic Episodes if we choose to implement this exclusionary criteria using these NESARC data. 
We do not rule out cases associated with recent illness or bereavement. If we drop anyone with such 
episodes, we see something more problematic: 
 
. tab pg_dsm_count pg_lifetime if manic_episodes==0, missing 
 
 Number of | 
 PG DSM-IV | 
  criteria |      pg_lifetime 
       met |         0        Yes |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
         0 |    39,515          0 |    39,515  
         1 |     1,159          0 |     1,159  
         2 |       401          0 |       401  
         3 |       218          0 |       218  
         4 |        92          5 |        97  
         5 |        16         45 |        61  
         6 |         1         33 |        34  
         7 |         1         29 |        30  
         8 |         0         19 |        19  
         9 |         0          9 |         9  
        10 |         0          2 |         2  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
     Total |    41,403        142 |    41,545  
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In other words, many of the 195 originally classified as PG should have been excluded. Specifically, 
53 subjects: 
 
. tab pg_lifetime manic_episodes, missing 
 
pg_lifetim |    manic_episodes 
         e |         0          1 |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
         0 |    41,403      1,495 |    42,898  
       Yes |       142         53 |       195  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
     Total |    41,545      1,548 |    43,093  
 
We do not endorse this way of implementing the DSM-IV exclusionary criteria, but simply note here 
the consequences for sample size. 
 
 The hypothesis about what was done to generate the summary measure of PG that appears 
to have been used by all researchers using NESERC is confirmed if one does a “count” of the 
number of NESARC questions answered affirmatively: 
 
. tab pg_count pg_lifetime, missing 
 
 Number of | 
 PG NESARC | 
  criteria |      pg_lifetime 
       met |         0        Yes |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
         0 |    40,814          0 |    40,814  
         1 |     1,066          0 |     1,066  
         2 |       486          0 |       486  
         3 |       257          0 |       257  
         4 |       133          0 |       133  
         5 |        77         12 |        89  
         6 |        46         29 |        75  
         7 |        13         35 |        48  
         8 |         5         30 |        35  
         9 |         1         27 |        28  
        10 |         0         18 |        18  
        11 |         0         21 |        21  
        12 |         0         12 |        12  
        13 |         0          5 |         5  
        14 |         0          3 |         3  
        15 |         0          3 |         3  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
     Total |    42,898        195 |    43,093  
 
So we see that an individual was only classified as being PG in the summary measure if they had 5 of 
the 15 NESARC criteria. The fact that researchers used this summary measure is apparent from 
inspection of the reported sample size of 195 PG (e.g., Petry et al. [2005; Table 1, p. 568] or Blanco 
et al. [2006; Table 1, p.947]). 
 
 On the other hand, the above tabulation poses a puzzle, since there are many individuals 
with 5 or more of the 15 NESARC criteria that are not classified as PG. In fact, there are 
77+46+13+5+1 = 142 such individuals. It is not as if these 142 individuals met some of the 
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NESARC criteria that do not map into DSM criteria, since the NESARC criteria that they meet span 
all 15 NESARC questions. There appears to have been some algorithm used to defined PG in the 
summary measure that is not documented. For this reason we prefer to re-generate our own measure 
of PG using the DSM-IV criteria. 
 
 There are 207 correct DSM-IV based PG individuals in the NESARC: 
 
. tab pg_dsm_correct pg_lifetime, missing 
 
   Correct | 
    DSM-IV | 
  criteria | 
applied to | 
    NESARC | 
  data for |      pg_lifetime 
  lifetime |         0        Yes |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
         0 |    42,877          9 |    42,886  
         1 |        21        186 |       207  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
     Total |    42,898        195 |    43,093  
 
 There have been some variants of the DSM-IV threshold criteria applied in some research. 
For instance, as noted in the text, Fisher [2000] prefers the term “problem” to “pathological” outside 
of a shared, clinical diagnosis, and then (p. 33) defines problem gamblers using either 5 or more 
“yes” responses to the DSM-IV criteria or 3 or 4 “yes” responses that include at least one from items 
8, 9 or 10 of the criteria. These last three refer to the adverse consequences of gambling. This 
definition can only logically increase the number of “classified” gamblers compared to the use of 5 
or more “yes” responses. In fact, for the NESARC data this results in 256 “classified” gamblers 
compared to the 207 correct DSM-IV PG individuals: 
 
. tab pg_dsm_correct_extra, missing 
 
pg_dsm_corr | 
  ect_extra |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
          0 |     42,837       99.41       99.41 
          1 |        256        0.59      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |     43,093      100.00 
 
. tab pg_dsm_correct_extra pg_dsm_correct, missing 
 
           |    Correct DSM-IV 
           |  criteria applied to 
           |    NESARC data for 
pg_dsm_cor |       lifetime 
rect_extra |         0          1 |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
         0 |    42,837          0 |    42,837  
         1 |        49        207 |       256  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
     Total |    42,886        207 |    43,093  
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 It is also worthwhile doing the correct analysis using the DSM-V criteria. The new criteria 
drop the “illegal acts” question, and require that only 4 criteria be met. In this respect we mimic the 
approach of Petryy, Blanco, Jon and Grant [2014] to “re-cycling” the NESARC data in this manner: 
 
. tab pg_dsm5_correct pg_lifetime, missing 
 
   Correct | 
     DSM-V | 
  criteria | 
applied to | 
    NESARC |      pg_lifetime 
      data |         0        Yes |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
         0 |    42,772          0 |    42,772  
         1 |       126        195 |       321  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
     Total |    42,898        195 |    43,093  
 
So we now have 321 individuals with PG, using the DSM-V criteria. 
 
 We contacted researchers that have used NESARC to find out if there is some simple 
explanation for our finding of an error in the coding of PG. We keep their identity anonymous, for 
reasons that will become apparent. 
 
 One responded: 
 
Yes, NESARC is not easy to navigate. There are some sort of weights you need to 
add to the calculations, to weight by baseline characteristics because some subgroups 
were oversampled for the survey. I have not done this in many years, and no longer 
have the syntax. I believe they are described in many of the NESARC papers, as 
everybody appears to use these weights. My guess is that is what is incorrect, rather 
than how you’re coding the DSM criteria, which is more straightforward. In any case, 
I’m certain the numbers reported in the 2005 paper are correct, because many 
subsequent papers have been written about the PGs in that dataset, and no one’s 
reported difficulty replicating the n’s or analyses. I am not a statistician, but there are 
a lot of statisticians who are experienced at NESARC analyses and could probably 
help.  
 
In fact, we find NESARC relatively straightforward to navigate, and it is well documented apart 
from this apparent coding error. The use of survey weights, which we are aware of and use for 
appropriate tabulations (e.g., prevalence and odd ratio estimation), is not the issue since this refers to 
the raw sample count reported in published papers. The final point, that we should trust that 
everyone else that has used the data has checked this, is not germane to a scholarly evaluation of 
these data. There is a simple error or there is not. 
 
 A second researcher, a statistician and experienced at NESARC analysis, then responded: 
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I have read your attachment and have 2 initial comments that might help resolve this 
issue. First the skip item is only used during the interview to decide whether to ask 
additional pg questions and does not come into play with regard to creating 
diagnoses. Second we never use the ever columns to determine diagnoses. We use 
the 12 month and prior to the 12 month columns only and if positive for any of 
those 2 time frames we declare a lifetime diagnosis. If this does not resolve your 
issues please let me know so I can examine them more closely. 
 
The first point, about the skip question, is irrelevant to the issue. The second point is worth 
checking, and would arise from some inconsistency between reports made by the same individual 
about the same NESARC criteria. In fact, however, if one reviews the earlier extract from the 
questions involved, it is apparent that consistency here is enforced if the interviewer followed the logic 
of the skip pattern correctly.39 There are 4 such inconsistencies. In 3 of these 4 there was a positive 
responses to the direct lifetime question, but both the “last 12 months” and “before the last 12 
months” are left blank; perhaps the respondent said that they could not be bothered with the follow-
up. In 1 of these 4 the “last 12 months” was left blank but the “before 12 months” was marked NO. 
This cannot be the cause of the discrepancy we are pointing out. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
39 NESARC criteria #1 is asked on a lifetime basis. If the response is NO then the 12-month and 
before 12-month responses are left missing, which consistently implies a NO for lifetime. If the response to 
the direct lifetime question is YES then the “last 12 months” question is asked. If there is a YES to the “last 
12 months” question then the “before 12 months” question is asked, and whatever the response to that 
question we have consistency. If there is a NO to the “last 12 months” question then the “before 12 months” 
question is automatically filled in as a YES to ensure consistency. 
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Appendix B: Additional Documentation of Results (NOT FOR PUBLICATION) 
 
 All variables are defined from the original data files of wave 1 of the NESARC, and Stata 
code explaining the detailed definitions is available on request. The variables are as follows: 
 
variable name   variable label 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pg_dsm_correct  Correct DSM-IV criteria applied to NESARC data for lifetime 
 
alcohol         Any lifetime alcohol disorder 
drug            Any lifetime drug use disorder 
nicotine        Any lifetime nicotine disorder 
mood            Any mood disorder      
anxiety         Any anxiety disorder 
personality     Any personality disorder 
 
female          Female 
black           Black or Afro-American 
hispanic        Hispanic 
age30_44        Aged between 30 and 44 
age45_64        Aged between 45 and 64 
age65plus       Aged 65 and over 
separated       Separated by being widowed, divorced or separated 
midwest         Midwest region 
south           South region 
west            West region 
high_school     Completed High School or GED 
some_college    Completed some college 
college         Completed a college degree 
graduate        Completed a graduate degree 
income2         Personal income between $20,000 and $35,000 
income3         Personal income between $35,000 and $70,000 
income4         Personal income of $70,000 or more 
 
height          Height in feet 
weigh           Weight in stones 
 
friday          Interview conducted on a Friday 
saturday        Interview conducted on a Saturday 
sunday          Interview conducted on a Sunday 
 
pg_Ntriggers        Number of triggers activated when pg trigger question asked 
 
personality_battery1  Responses to questions on usual feelings and actions 
personality_battery2  Responses to questions on effects of feelings and actions 
 
ss_1            Sample Selection variable 1 from Screening Question #18 Part 1 
ss_2            Sample Selection variable 2 from Screening Question #18 Part 2 
ss_3            Sample Selection variable 3 from Screening Question #19 Part 1 
ss_4            Sample Selection variable 4 from Screening Question #19 Part 2 
ss_5            Sample Selection variable 5 from Screening Question #20 
ss_6            Sample Selection variable 6 from Screening Question #21 Part 1 
ss_7            Sample Selection variable 7 from Screening Question #21 Part 2 
ss_8            Sample Selection variable 8 from Screening Question #21 Part 3 
ss_9            Sample Selection variable 9 from Screening Question #22 
ss_10           Sample Selection variable 10 from Screening Question #23 Part 1 
ss_11           Sample Selection variable 11 from Screening Question #23 Part 2 
ss_12           Sample Selection variable 12 from Screening Question #23 Part 3 
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ss_13           Sample Selection variable 13 from Screening Question #23 Part 4 
ss_14           Sample Selection variable 14 from Screening Question #23 Part 5 
ss_15           Sample Selection variable 15 from Screening Question #23 Part 6 
ss_16           Sample Selection variable 16 from Screening Question #23 Part 7 
ss_17           Sample Selection variable 17 from Screening Question #23 Part 8 
ss_18           Sample Selection variable 18 from Screening Question #23 Part 9 
ss_19           Sample Selection variable 19 from Screening Question #23 Part 10 
ss_20           Sample Selection variable 20 from Screening Question #23 Part 11 
ss_21           Sample Selection variable 21 from Screening Question #23 Part 12 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Summary statistics are as follows: 
 
    Variable |        Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
pg_dsm_cor~t |     43,093    .0046875    .0683057          0          1 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
     alcohol |     43,093    .2748242    .4464308          0          1 
        drug |     43,093    .0944005    .2923885          0          1 
    nicotine |     43,093    .1609774    .3675144          0          1 
        mood |     43,093    .2111944    .4081607          0          1 
     anxiety |     43,093    .1732764    .3784904          0          1 
 personality |     43,093    .1460794    .3531899          0          1 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
      female |     43,093    .5702782    .4950421          0          1 
       black |     43,093    .1995684    .3996806          0          1 
    hispanic |     43,093    .1927923     .394496          0          1 
    age30_44 |     43,093    .3105377    .4627191          0          1 
    age45_64 |     43,093    .2979602    .4573672          0          1 
   age65plus |     43,093    .1904022    .3926229          0          1 
   separated |     43,093    .2579769    .4375263          0          1 
     midwest |     43,093    .2086418    .4063425          0          1 
       south |     43,093    .3749101    .4841053          0          1 
        west |     43,093    .2259532    .4182133          0          1 
 high_school |     43,093     .291161    .4543028          0          1 
some_college |     43,093    .2063212    .4046685          0          1 
     college |     43,093    .2093844    .4068739          0          1 
    graduate |     43,093    .1109925    .3141265          0          1 
     income2 |     43,093    .2314761    .4217808          0          1 
     income3 |     43,093    .2095236    .4069733          0          1 
     income4 |     43,093    .2906969    .4540892          0          1 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
      height |     43,093    5.549293    .3356052          4          7 
       weigh |     43,093    12.17406    2.914927   4.428571   35.71429 
      friday |     43,093    .1413919    .3484294          0          1 
    saturday |     43,093    .1438981    .3509904          0          1 
      sunday |     43,093    .0768106    .2662938          0          1 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
pg_Ntriggers |     43,093    .1886385    .7641052          0          7 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
personalit~1 |     43,093    3.466642    4.772873          0         55 
personalit~2 |     43,093    3.443552    4.769596          0         55 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
        ss_1 |     43,093     .348154    .4763907          0          1 
        ss_2 |     43,093    .3008841    .4586477          0          1 
        ss_3 |     43,093    .2764718    .4472581          0          1 
        ss_4 |     43,093    .2422435    .4284459          0          1 
        ss_5 |     43,093    .3640963    .4811814          0          1 
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        ss_6 |     43,093      .76256     .425519          0          1 
        ss_7 |     43,093    .7989697    .4007753          0          1 
        ss_8 |     43,093    .4865291    .4998243          0          1 
        ss_9 |     43,093    .2665166    .4421426          0          1 
       ss_10 |     43,093    .3197503    .4663851          0          1 
       ss_11 |     43,093    .3476435    .4762276          0          1 
       ss_12 |     43,093    .1458938    .3530038          0          1 
       ss_13 |     43,093    .0624463    .2419673          0          1 
       ss_14 |     43,093    .0896897    .2857401          0          1 
       ss_15 |     43,093     .079224    .2700912          0          1 
       ss_16 |     43,093    .2083633    .4061427          0          1 
       ss_17 |     43,093    .0647437    .2460759          0          1 
       ss_18 |     43,093    .0561576    .2302285          0          1 
       ss_19 |     43,093    .1168867     .321289          0          1 
       ss_20 |     43,093    .0552526    .2284753          0          1 
       ss_21 |     43,093    .0641636    .2450469          0          1 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 The sample selection screening questions come from the “Background Information” section 
of the NESARC questionnaire, reproduced below. 
 
 A13 
 
 
 
 
  
 A14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 A15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figures B1, B2 and B3 show distributions of the predicted marginal probabilities of each 
gambling disorder category for the DSM-IV screen from the British Gambling Prevalence Survey of 2010, 
the PGSI screen of the Victorian Gambling Survey of 2008, and the NODS screen of the Victorian 
Gambling Survey of 2008. In some cases the horizontal axes include labels for probabilities below 0 
or above 1: this is an artefact of the kernel density procedure used to display distributions as well as 
the use of the “delta method” to approximate non-linear combinations of estimated parameters. These 
are of no substantive or statistical significance for our purposes. 
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Appendix C: Formal Statistical Model (NOT FOR PUBLICATION) 
 
 The statistical model is an extension of the standard Heckman model in two ways: 
 
• The main equation is an ordered probit instead of OLS specification 
• The bivariate distribution between the selection equation and the main equation is specified in a 
semi-nonparament (SNP) manner. 
 
 Following De Luca and Perotti [2011; p. 215], the ordered probit sample selection model can 
be defined in three equations: 
 
 Yj* = βj⊤ Xj + Uj j = 1, 2 (1) 
 Y1 = I( Y1* ≥ 0 ) (2) 
 Y2 =  h=0, H h I( αh < Y2* ≤  αh+1 ) if Y1 = 1 (3) 
 
where Y1* is a continuous latent variable for the sample selection equation, Y2* is a continuous latent 
variable for the risk of GD, βj denotes kj vectors of parameters to be estimated, Xj denotes kj vectors 
of exogenous variables, the Uj are random errors, I(⋅) is the indicator function, Y1 is the binary 
variable indicating the observed sample when Y1 = 1, Y2 is the observed level of GD, H+1 denotes 
the ordered categories of GD, and (α0, …, αh, αh+1, …, αH) are thresholds to be estimated, with  
α0 = -∞, αh < αh+1 and αH = ∞.  
 
 Equation (2) defines the sample selection process by which we observe the sample for which 
Y1 = 1, and by itself is just a probit equation. Equation (3) defines the ordered probit, conditional on 
sample selection, which means conditional on responding affirmatively to the trigger question for 
GD. The H cutpoints (α0, …, αh, αh+1, …, αH), to be estimated, define H+1 intervals over the latent 
variable Y2*.  The correlation of the latent regressions errors U1 and U2 determines selectivity 
effects. If this correlation is positive (negative) then it means that unobservables have the same 
(opposite) effect on selection and the risk of GD.40 
 
 
40 The traditional parametric specific of the model assumes that the errors U1 and U2 follow a 
bivariate Normal distribution with zero means, unit variances, and a correlation coefficient ρ. The SNP 
innovation is to approximate the marginal distribution functions of U1 and U2, and their joint distribution 
function. The approximation starts with an approximation of the joint density by the product of a 
standardized normal density for U1; a standardized normal density for U2; a polynomial of order R in U1 and 
U2, with R×R polynomial coefficients to be estimated; and a normalization factor. Once this joint density is 
approximated, one can use it to approximate the marginal distribution functions of U1 and U2 (De Luca 
[2008]). The fact that the standardized normal densities are used for the first two terms of this approximation 
means that a special case of the SNP specification is the parametric specification, allowing a direct test of the 
hypothesis that the SNP estimates are the same as the parametric estimates. 
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 There are four identifiability restrictions on this model. The first is familiar from the 
parametric ordered probit and ordered logit models, that the intercept in β2 be set to zero. The 
second is that the exogenous variables X1 contain at least one variable not contained in X2. 
Although this “exclusion restriction” is not formally needed in the parametric model, identification is 
then only likely to be weak (Meng and Schmidt [1985] and Keane [1992]). However, this restriction 
is formally needed in the semi-parametric case (Lee [1995]). In our case we have a long list of 
variables that meet this exclusion restriction. Third, X1 and X2 must each contain one continuous 
variable, or have sufficient coverage from a rich list of discrete variables (Manski [1988]). In our case 
we have variables denoting age (and the square of age) and the weight of the individual, as well as 
rich array of discrete variables. Fourth, since the means of U1 and U2 are not constrained to be zero 
with the SNP estimator, the intercept of β1 and the first threshold α1 are set equal to the parametric 
estimates. 
 
 The estimation of this SNP ordered probit model is based on software developed by De 
Luca and Perotti [2011], which in turn is based on components developed by Stewart [2005] and De 
Luca [2008]. The software runs on Stata version 15, although all estimations run on Stata version 14. 
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